SURVIVORS' RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL | Sudan Alert Document Two

Sudan is crippled by an 18-year civil war that has cost 2 million lives and displaced another 4 million. The extremist National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum is utilizing a policy of orchestrated violence targeting members of its civilian population – marginalized groups in the north, and Christians and animists in the south that the government views as a threat to its power – that amounts to genocide. The NIF is indiscriminately bombing civilian and humanitarian sites, tolerating slavery, utilizing fierce militias for ground attacks on villages, instigating tribal warfare, using food as a weapon of destruction against civilians, and practicing a policy of widespread persecution on account of race, ethnicity, and religion. Therefore, the U.S. should adopt a hard-lined strategy that will bring about the immediate cessation of genocidal atrocities by the NIF and foster a resolution to the conflict that will guarantee a just and lasting peace for all Sudanese.

Several reports from credible human rights groups have documented the link between the escalation of the NIF's bombing campaign and other atrocities committed upon civilians with the progressive attainment of oil rich land and an increase in export revenues. As the government in Khartoum has doubled its oil export revenues it has doubled its military expenditures, and it has severely escalated the atrocities it is committing on the civilian population with the use of new and heavier weaponry. Thus, oil is a disincentive to peace talks for the government in Khartoum. The government believes that it will win the war so long as it continues to receive more money through exporting oil and so long as it continues to use that revenue to purchase heavier weaponry of which it can continue to use on targeted groups of civilians and opposition forces. Several areas marked for oil development have not yet been "cleared" of its civilian population, signaling the potential for a rise in atrocities and the decimation of targeted groups.

Given the clear connection between the attainment of oil and an escalation in violence orchestrated by the NIF government in Khartoum, the fact that the NIF has adopted a friendly policy with international terrorist and militia groups, and that the NIF has a pattern of at first acquiescing to demands placed on it by the international community to appear as if it is willing to cooperate only to shortly thereafter renew genocidal tactics (thus any temporary subsiding of bombing attacks on civilian targets should not be interpreted as a willingness of the government to negotiate peace), the U.S. should therefore heed those recommendations from groups that warn about the danger of jump starting peace negotiations with the NIF government through any mechanisms of appeasement. For such mechanisms of appeasement were disastrous in dealing with the Milosevic regime, and as result strengthened the resolve of the opposition army (Kosova Liberation Army (KLA)) and civilian Kosovar Albanians to pick up arms and fight for independence after interpreting the actions of the international community as having abandoned them throughout various stages of peace initiatives in the Balkans.

A policy front-loaded with carrots, such as opening the U.S. embassy in Khartoum or lifting current sanctions would be interpreted by the NIF, the opposition in the south (Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army and the National Democratic Alliance (SPLM/A and the NDA)) and Sudanese civilians, along with others in the international community as legitimizing the present government in Khartoum. Such actions would also be interpreted by the SPLM/A, the NDA and targeted civilians as abandonment on behalf of the U.S. thereby hardening the opposition's resolve to continue fighting and demand independence outright of any peace talks. In addition, as civilians are always left out of such high-level processes that decide their fates, feelings of being abandoned by the U.S. and the rest of the international community at this stage could result in several more civilians joining ranks with the opposition in attempt to continue fighting against the government and for independence. It is unlikely that any southern opposition force or other targeted groups of civilians would regard the resolution of any peace as success that is not also a just peace to end the conflict. Peace at any price that is void of justice will not be viewed as a viable option for groups that have suffered years of oppression by the government in Khartoum.

Any policy front loaded with rewards for the government of Khartoum that does not first demand concrete actions that show the NIF is serious about negotiating a just peace and that it has ended its genocidal campaign, and is absent of legitimate threats of the use of force that are not then backed by the actual use of effective force if needed by the U.S. should the government in Khartoum not live up to its commitments, would be to send a message to the NIF that the U.S. is not serious about negotiating peace in Sudan or ending the atrocities. The result would be a green light for the NIF to attempt to re-ignite or step up genocidal atrocities once again in attempt to increase its oil revenue to win the war and serve to drag out negotiations. Thus, any policy the U.S. adopts in effort to end hostilities and achieve a just peace should reward Khartoum only after evidence that it is willing to negotiate in good faith for a resolution to the war. The U.S. should take the lead in peace efforts in Sudan and demand the immediate and continued cessation of indiscriminate bombings and attacks on unarmed civilians and humanitarian sites and the obstruction of food supplies as evidence that Khartoum is willing to negotiate in good faith for a just and lasting peace.

The U.S. should regard those recommendations that suggest the appointment of a special envoy to pressure the NIF into halting genocidal atrocities and into serious peace negotiations – for a just peace – and that can pressure those countries whose oil companies are doing business with Khartoum to also become brokers of peace; impose capital market sanctions against those foreign companies doing oil business with Khartoum from raising capital or listing its securities in U.S. markets; provide effective protection for targeted groups and/or increase support to the south in effort to level the negotiating positions between the south and the NIF and give the south the means to protect itself throughout the process should negotiations fail at some stage without adequate warning; build on and support the peace efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in endorsing the Declaration of Principles (DOP) establishing the right to self-determination for the south and for a form of government that will protect marginalized and targeted groups living in the north; and the U.S. should ensure that any negotiations for peace include staunch measures ensuring effective international guarantees for all targeted groups that would be backed by U.S. support should such measures not prove to provide effective protection.

Here, the U.S. should remain mindful of the need for effective international guarantees, during and post-conflict, during any peace initiative it enters with Khartoum and remember the lessons learned from the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 and the Indonesian government orchestrated violence against innocent civilians in East Timor surrounding its vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999. The international community's aspirations to keep countries together if at all possible should not be forced to the detriment of Sudanese civilians or at the sacrifice of any more lives. One Sudan with two autonomous systems should also be one that guarantees the cessation of grave systematic human rights abuses and humanitarian disasters, particularly for targeted groups in the north such as those of the Nuba Mountains, of which will first require serious democratic reform of the government in Khartoum.

For more information:

U.S. Policy to End Sudan's War: Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy

Testimony of Roger Winter, Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees

Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom on Sudan

Sudanese War Burns on Thanks to Revenues from Foreign Oil Companies

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