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SRI Action Alert: Burma
July 15, 2003
Facts
Current Crisis
In May 30, 2003 supporters of the military junta launched a vicious attack on NLD
party leader Suu Kyi's traveling convoy, killing and injuring scores of people
following her release from house arrest that lasted eighteen months1, and
government promises to hold talks with the NLD regarding the liberalization of
Burma's political system. The Burmese junta then arrested, and held
incommunicado, Suu Kyi, dozens of her supporters, and 18 members of the NLD. The
junta has since closed the NLD headquarters all over the country. Despite
international protests, the military government has refused to release Suu Kyi.
Reports outside of those released by the military government claim that many have
been killed with hundreds injured in the latest clashes that followed between
opposition and the army. Suu Kyi is currently being detained in the most
notorious prison in Burma, the Insein prison, under what has been described to be
"the most draconian of the Burmese military regime's laws." The 1975 state
protection law allows for detention up to a total of five years, with no prospect
of appeal and without access to family or lawyers for 180 days at a time.
Since Su Kyi's arrest on May 30, 2003 the United States has increased pressure on
the military junta. On June 12, 2003 the Senate voted 971 on June 12 to approve
a bill that would extend a visa ban for paramilitary officials, freeze the
American-held assets of the nation and top officials, and bar imports from Burma.
On June 16, 2003 the European Union extended its travel ban and froze the assets
of 150 members of the Burma regime, their families and associates, and tightened
its arms embargo. In addition, in a rare move, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) urged Burma to release Suu Kyi, thereby breaking its tradition of
not criticizing member governments' internal affairs.
So far, the United Nations has sent the UN Secretary General's Envoy to Burma,
urging the junta generals to enter into dialogue with the democracy movement, and
extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights on Burma,
expressing concern about the high level of human rights violation. The
International labor Organization (ILO) has also recommended sanctions against
Burma for her widespread forced labor. Now it is time for the UN Security Council
to take the issue up.
About 350,000 refugees fled across Burma's borders to Thailand, China,
Bangladesh, and India. These refugees often live in poor conditions, falling
short of international standards, but these governments have consistently failed
to provide access to international human rights organizations to address these
problems. More seriously, as of June 1, 2003, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India,
save China, have not been signatures to the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), which is the most important refugee
law and has been ratified by 142 nations.2 This reflects not only the
unwillingness of these countries to submit to international scrutiny on their
refugee policies. A consistent legal framework is vital to refugee protection.
Recent Developments
On May 6, 2002, when the military junta released Aung San Suu Kyi, after 19
months of house arrest (See FN1), it promised to hold talks with the democratic
opposition she headed about the liberalization of political system. However, to
this date there have been no talks and more than 1,300 political prisoners remain
in jail.3
Background
In 1962, General Ne Win, through a military coup overthrew the democratically
elected Prime Minister U Nu, abolished the federal system and inaugurated "the
Burmese Way to Socialism" through nationalizing the economy and forming a
single-party state. In his totalitarian regime, the army became extremely
powerful and engaged various forms of political and socioeconomic oppression
against the people of Burma. During this period, the regime's corruption and
mismanagement destroyed the economy and by 1987, Burma was classified as one of
the world's least-developed countries.4 In the same year, devaluation of the
currency led to a series of anti-government riots. By 1988, these riots
culminated into a people's movement which the government put down brutally. In
the same year, the government established the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC). Although in 1988 Ne Win lost power, a different military junta,
known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), was formed. In 1989,
SLORC declared martial law, arrested thousands of people, including advocates of
democracy and human rights, renamed Burma Myanmar, with the capital, Rangoon,
becoming Yangon. The emerging democratic leader of the National League for
Democracy (NLD), Aung San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest. By the late
eighties then, the NLD had become a political threat to the military and had
unified the Burmese people under the banner of a democratic vision for Burma.
In 1990, the junta held parliamentary elections in which Suu Kyi's NLD won 392 of
the 485 seats even though she was under house arrest. But the junta canceled the
election and dismissed the results of the elections. Burma to this date has not
held any other elections. It does not have a constitution or a legislature. All
the junta generals' decrees have the force of law. There is no freedom of
assembly. Trade union, collective bargaining, and strikes are illegal.5
Today, the combination of the junta's corruption, fiscal mismanagement, and the
pullout of foreign businesses have devastated Burma's sociopolitical structure
and done little for the development of the Burmese people. The government has
been spending at least five times as much on weapons as on health and education
together. While the junta tripled the size of the armed forces between 1988 and
2000 alone, roughly 40 percent of the country's children remain malnourished. The
UN has reported that as many as one in fifty Burma citizens are infected with
HIV. The World Health Organization (WHO) recently rated Burma's health system as
second-worst in the world.6
The economic sector is no better off. In 2002, Burma's currency, the kyat, traded
at over 800 kyat to one US dollar while the official rate remained six kyat to
one dollar. Large increases in the price of rice and other commodities, power
shortage, and the lack of aid have continually led to serious economic hardship
for much of the population.7 Recently, the widespread collapse of the banking
system has shut down many businesses and infuriated depositors who have lost
their savings. As its economy has collapsed, the junta has become more dependent
on money laundering linked to the drug trade. Now Burma is the world's biggest
producer of opium. What is worse, the junta has plans for dubious nuclear
programs.8
The extent of Burma's problems does not end there. Since it gained independence
from the United Kingdom in 1948, ethnic conflicts have continued between the
central government, dominated by ethnic majority Burmans, and ethnic minority
militias, mostly located in the eastern half of the country. There are at least
eight identifiable ethnic communities based on linguistic, religious, and
regional divisions (Burman represents 68 percent; Shan, 9 percent; Karen, 7
percent; Arakanese, 4 percent; Chinese, 3 percent; Mon, 2 percent; Indians, 2
percent; and Chin and Kachin together, 5 percent).9 The British colonialism
distinguished between lowland Burmans and the highland minorities, and left a
legacy of bitter ethnic hatred that has continued to this day. Fanned by the
divisive policies institutionalized by the military government, the majority
Burmans have not been able to live in peace with the minority groups. The ethnic
antagonism has hence hindered national building and constitutional order. Since
1990, the policy of preferential treatment of a few minority groups over others
has become worse through allowing some ethnic armies to control the drug trade in
their respective zones in exchange for sharing the wealth from drugs and not
attacking the Burmese army. Simultaneously, the junta has continued arbitrary
executions and forced labor against other ethnic militias.10 (Please refer to
SRI's reports on the Arakan state and the state of Rohingya Refugees). As a
result of the continued depopulation policy in some ethnic minority areas, by
2000, there were at least 600,000 displaced people in eastern Burma. 350,000
refugees fled across Burma's borders to Thailand, China, and Bangladesh.11
Concluding Remarks
The recent political developments in Burma indicate that the Burmese military
have not demonstrated the will to hold talks with the democratic opposition.
Instead, its recent vicious attack on NLD and the detainment of Aung Sun Su Kyi
and her colleagues serve as a grim reminder of the junta's approach to dealing
with threat with force and how it intends to deal with dissenting voices.
The role of the international community in this light is extremely significant to
increase pressure on the military government to change and recognize the voices
of the Burmese people. Economic sanctions, travel bans and freezing of assets are
ultimately short-term solutions to the political problem in Burma and could in
the long-run have a greater negative impact on the local populace than on the
regime. What is required therefore is greater pressure from the outside world
and neighboring Asian countries such as China, India, Bangladesh, and Thailand to
force the government of Burma to recognize the will of the people. These Asian
countries should be urged to stem its support and reconsider their links to the
Burmese authorities. In this regard, ASEAN's recent call for the release of Suu
Kyi, breaking its tradition of not criticizing member governments' internal
affairs, was a first step toward pushing the Burmese government toward reform.
This tension should be maintained and accelerated to help the Burmese people to
bring about a change that will address their concerns within a framework
equitably accessible for all.
SRI Recommendations:
Footnotes:
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